Definition (marginal contribution)
The marginal contribution of agent i for a coalition C ⊆ N \ {i} is mc i (C) = v(C ∪ {i}) − v(C).
mc 1 (∅), mc 2 ({1}), mc 3 ({1, 2}) is an efficient payoff distribution for any game ({1, 2, 3}, v). This payoff distribution may model a dynamic process in which 1 starts a coalition, is joined by 2, and finally 3 joins the coalition {1, 2}, and where the incoming agent gets its marginal contribution.
An agent's payoff depends on which agents are already in the coalition. This payoff may not be fair. To increase fairness,one could take the average marginal contribution over all possible joining orders.
Let σ represent a joining order of the grand coalition N, i.e., σ is a permutation of 1, . . . , n . We write mc(σ) ∈ R n the payoff vector where agent i obtains Shapley value: version based on marginal contributions Let (N, v) be a TU game. Let Π(N) denote the set of all permutations of the sequence 1, . . . , n .
n! the Shapley value is a fair payoff distribution based on marginal contributions of agents averaged over joining orders of the coalition. An example There are |C|! permutations in which all members of C precede i.
There are |N \ (C ∪ {i})|! permutations in which the remaining members succede i, i.e. (|N| − |C| − 1)!.
The Shapley value Sh i (N, v) of the TU game (N, v) for player i can also be written
Using definition, the sum is over 2 |N|−1 instead of |N|!. Notion of value Definition (value function) Let G N the set of all TU games (N, v). A value function φ is a function that assigns to each TU game (N, v) an efficient allocation, i.e. φ :
The Shapley value is a value function.
None of the concepts presented thus far were a value function (the nucleolus is guaranteed to be non-empty only for games with a non-empty set of imputations).
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Unanimity game
Let N be a set of agents and T ⊆ N \ ∅. The unanimity game (N, v T ) is defined as follows:
We note that if i ∈ N \ T, i is a null player. if (i, j) ∈ T 2 , i and j are substitutes.
Lemma
The set {v T | T ⊆ N \ ∅} is a linear basis of G N .
This means that a TU game (N, v) can be represented by a unique set of values (α T ) T⊆N\∅ such that
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Proof of the lemma There are 2 n − 1 unanimity games and the dimension of G N is also 2 n − 1. We only need to prove that the unanimity games are linearly independent. Towards a contradiction, let us assume that Proof of the theorem: Uniqueness (2/2) Let T ⊆ N \ ∅ and α ∈ R. Let us prove that φ(N, α · v T ) is uniquely defined.
Since φ is a value function, it is efficient. Then,
This proves that φ(N, α · v T ) is uniquely defined.Since any TU game (N, v) can be written as T⊆N\∅ α T v T and because of ADD, there is a unique value function that satisfies the three axioms. Proof of the theorem: Existence We need to show that the Shapley value satisfies the three axioms. Let (N, v) a TU game.
Let us assume there is an agent i such that for all C ⊆ N \ {i} we have v(C) = v(C ∪ {i}).Then, each marginal contribution of player i is zero, and it follows that Discussion about the axioms SYM: it is desirable that two subsitute agents obtain the same value DUM: it is desirable that an agent that does not bring anything in the cooperation does not get any value. What does the addition of two games mean?
+ if the payoff is interpreted as an expected payoff, ADD is a desirable property. + for cost-sharing games, the interpretation is intuitive: the cost for a joint service is the sum of the costs of the separate services. -there is no interaction between the two games.
-the structure of the game (N, v + w) may induce a behavior that has may be unrelated to the behavior induced by either games (N, v) or (N, w).
The axioms are independent. If one of the axiom is dropped, it is possible to find a different value function satisfying the remaining two axioms.
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Marginal contribution:
A value function φ satisfies marginal contribution axiom iff for all i ∈ N,
The value of a player depends only on its marginal contribution.
Theorem (H.P. Young)
The Shapley value is the unique value function that satisfies symmetry and marginal contribution axioms.
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Balanced contribution: A value function φ satisfies balanced contribution iff for all
For any two agents, the amount that each agent would win or lose if the other "leaves the game" should be the same.
Theorem (R Myerson)
The Shapley value is the unique value function that satisfies the balanced contribution axiom.
Some properties

Theorem
For superadditive games, the Shapley value is an imputation.
Lemma
For convex game, the Shapley value is in the core. Proofs Let (N, v) be a superadditive TU game. Let (N, v) be a convex game. We know that all marginal vectors are in the core (to show that convex games have non-empty core, we used one marginal vector and showed it was in the core).
The core is a convex set. The average of a finite set of points in a convex set is also in the set. Finally, the Shapley value is in the core.
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